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When the emperor submitted to his rebellious subjects: a neglected and innovative legal account 
of the 1183-Peace of Constance* 
 
The settlement reached at Constance in 1183 between the Lombard League and the Holy Roman Emperor 
Frederick I Barbarossa is generally considered the formal foundation of the Italian city republics and thus a 
landmark in medieval European history.1 Furthermore, it overturned the effects of the Diet of Roncaglia of 1158, 
whose definition of royal/imperial prerogatives (iura regalia) is commonly regarded as a milestone in the 
conceptualisation and growth of royal authority and public law in Western Europe.2 At Roncaglia Barbarossa 
was assisted by the leading Bolognese lawyers of the time, who were reviving jurisprudence through the study of 
Roman law.3 Those iura regalia were not under imperial control, and Barbarossa proceeded to claim them back 
from the city republics that by then dominated northern Italy. The rebellion of the cities that coalesced into the 
League eventually forced him, at Constance, to grant most of the iura regalia to them, including the free election 
of their consuls, civil and criminal jurisdiction, the right to have armies and to build fortifications, and their 
holding of what had been recognised as public assets, such as public routes and waterways, within and outside 
the city, and the emperor also entitled the members of the League to keep their association and renew it 
whenever they wished.4  
                                                 
* I would like to thank Joseph Canning and Guido Rossi for their comments and suggestions. 
1 Among others: Q. Skinner, The Foundation of Modern Political Thought (2 vols., Cambridge, 1978), 
i. 5. 
2 Ibid. See also: K. Pennington, The Prince and the Law, 1200–1600: Sovereignty and Rights in the 
Western Legal Tradition (Berkeley, CA, 1993), 12–21. 
3 G. Dilcher and D. Quaglioni, eds., Gli inizi del diritto pubblico: l’età di Federico Barbarossa: 
legislazione e scienza del diritto (Bologna, 2006); E. Conte, ‘Federico I Barbarossa e il diritto 
pubblico giustinianeo’, Bullettino dell’Istituto storico italiano per il medio evo e Archivio 
muratoniano, 95 (1990), 237–59. 
4 Friderici I Diplomata. 1181–1190, in M[onumenta] G[ermaniae] H[istorica], Diplomata regum et 
imperatorum Germaniae, 10/ pt. iv, ed. H. Appelt (Hannover, 1990), no. 848. For an account and 
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 Scholarship, however, has ordinarily overlooked the fact that the Diet of Roncaglia and the 
Peace of Constance shared certain features.5 The Peace of Constance, for example, is usually portrayed 
as a capitulation, but in reality it was a compromise which, echoing Roncaglia, also recognized that 
the iura regalia were the emperor’s to bestow and defined a set of reserved prerogatives embodying 
the enduring superiority of the emperor, such as the appellate jurisdiction or the duty of city consuls to 
take an oath of featly to the emperor, among others.6 Scholarship has neglected that side of the Peace 
of Constance largely because, with hindsight, it has perceived the role of the empire in Italy as a lost 
cause. Yet no such privilege of hindsight belonged to the people who lived in the Middle Ages, or 
even the early modern period, when imperial authority continued to loom over Italy, and especially for 
those who lived in the thirteenth century, when, as we shall see, the Peace of Constance was bitterly 
fought over and the emperor came close to winning—not to mention that the contents of the Peace of 
                                                 
analysis of the conflict between Barbarossa and the Lombard cities as well as its outcomes: G. 
Raccagni, The Lombard League (Oxford, 2010), 147–88. 
5 See notes 1–3 above. 
6 Friderici I Diplomata. 1181–1190, no. 848. Residual imperial prerogatives also included the duty of 
the city consuls to seek imperial investiture; the duty of the members of the League to provide 
customary military services and help the emperor protecting his rights and possessions in Lombardy; 
the application of the fodrum, a tax paid when the emperor was in Italy, usually during his coronation 
journey to Rome, during which time the cities had to ensure the availability of provisions and the 
maintenance of roads and bridges; finally, the existence of residual local regalia belonging to the 
emperor was envisaged (the Peace of Constance only bestowed to the cities those regalia they had 
held since before the war), which were to be identified by local commissions; city communes could 
avoid those enquiries by paying a yearly flat but negotiable rate of two thousand silver marks. Those 
imperial prerogatives were enforced in the following years, but they were steadily eroded after the 
death of Emperor Henry VI: A. Haverkamp. Herrschaftsformen der Frühstaufer in Reichsitalien (2 
vols., Stuttgart, 1970–1). 
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Constance, including its imperial prerogatives, nominally persisted and were evoked time and again 
over the centuries.  
 Indeed, the enduring relevance of the Peace of Constance in the medium and long term is 
another greatly neglected feature of that remarkable document. It has attracted such little attention, and 
this has been fragmented and niche at best, that it is virtually unknown to wider scholarship. Yet a 
preliminary assessment of that legacy of the Peace of Constance as a whole reveals that a great wealth 
of references to it can be found in documentary sources as well as historical, rhetorical, political, and 
legal works through the centuries and well beyond Italy, all of which suggests that it enjoyed a 
remarkably long and influential legacy and calls for a more thorough investigation. After all, apart 
from being considered a functioning document for centuries, and, as we shall see, igniting a bitter 
argument in Italy and Germany in the thirteenth century, several leading medieval and early modern 
scholars from across Europe took it into full account, from the Italians Azo, Odofredus, and Accursius 
in the thirteenth century, Bartulus and Baldus in the fourteenth, to the French Jean Bodin and Charles 
Dumoulin, the Dutch Pierre Goudelin, and the Scot Thomas Craig in the late sixteenth–early 
seventeenth centuries, to mention just a few.7 Goudelin, in particular, mentioned the Peace of 
Constance in one of the earliest works on peace treaties, which is essentially a commentary of the 
Peace of Constance itself (the 1628 Louvain edition was entitled De jure pacis commentarius ad 
constitutionem Frederici de pace Constantiense) and therefore shows exceptionally well how it was 
                                                 
7 For a far from exhaustive but illuminating series of examples (Azo, Accursius, Jean Bodin, and 
Goudelin are not cited, for example,): G. Dolezalek, ‘Der Friede von Konstanz 1183 in der Literatur 
des “Jus Commune”’, in G. Dilcher and D. Quaglioni, eds., Gli inizi del diritto pubblico europeo, II. 
Da Federico I a Federico II, ed. (Bologna, 2008), 277–308; G. Raccagni, ‘The teaching of rhetoric 
and the Magna Carta of the Lombard cities: the Peace of Constance, the empire and the papacy in the 
works of Guido Faba and his leading contemporary colleagues’, Journal of Medieval History, 39 
(2013), 61–79. More on Azo, Accursius, Jean Bodin later. 
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still considered a prime example in the early modern period.8 The fortune of the Peace of Constance 
probably reached a peak with its little-known incorporation in the printed editions of such a 
fundamental work for the development of medieval and modern European legal and political thought 
as the Corpus Iuris Civilis, but, it was already mentioned in the glossa ordinaria since the thirteenth 
century.9 
 In fact, the above-mentioned preliminary assessment of the legacy of the Peace of Constance 
also reveals that, contrary to current practice, the imperial prerogatives that it established were the side 
of the settlement that frequently attracted most attention in the medieval and early modern period. Just 
to cite a few examples: in the 1220s the German Premonstratensian Burchard von Ursberg wrote that 
at Constance Barbarossa had reached an agreement with the Lombards regarding what they owed him, 
and that since then the Lombards had been refusing to do more than prescribed in the written 
settlement.10 The late medieval lords of Milan claimed that the titles they obtained from the emperors 
came with the imperial prerogatives of the Peace of Constance.11 Those prerogatives played a 
significant role in Bodin’s Les six livres de la république, one of the key works of political philosophy 
of the sixteenth century.12 
This article aims to tackle those neglected sides of the Peace of Constance by focusing on an 
even more neglected testimony left by one of the leading Bolognese jurists of the thirteenth century, 
Odofredus Denari (d. c.1265), which not only focuses on the imperial prerogatives, but also offers an 
                                                 
8 R. Lesaffer, ‘An early treatise on peace treatises: Petrus Gudelinus between Roman law and modern 
practice’, Journal of Legal History, 23 (2002), 223–52. 
9 Dolezalek, ‘Der Friede’, 277-308. 
10 Burchardi praepositi urspergensis chonicon, ed. O. Holder-Hegger and B. von Simon (MGH, 
Scriptores separatim editi, 16; Hannover, 1916), 57.  
11 J. Black, Absolutism in Renaissance Milan: Plenitude of Power and the Visconti and the Sforza 
1329–1535 (Oxford, 2009), 54, 57–8, 71, 200. 
12 Jean Bodin, Les six livres de la république (1583), I.ix. 183, 243. On the significance of Bodin’s 
work: Skinner, The Foundation, 208. 
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account of how they were established that sharply differs from the way scholarship conventionally 
depicts that settlement.13 Furthermore, the examination of Odofredus’ testimony is a fundamental 
stepping-stone for assessing the subsequent legacy of the Peace of Constance because it played a 
fundamental role in shaping it. Odofredus glossed the Peace of Constance and mentioned it in his 
academic lectures (both unedited), and, while secondary literature portrays it as a charter resulting 
from an agreement, he astoundingly stated that Barbarossa submitted himself, for the definition of his 
own prerogatives, to the ruling of the rectors of the League.  
Odofredus’ reconstruction bursts with major conceptual and political implications, whose 
significance is further enhanced by the very wide and long-term influence of his account, but 
scholarship has ignored it or, at best, dismissed it as a purely academic exercise marred by eccentric 
mistakes.14 Various testimonies left by Odofredus on other very significant historical topics have 
attracted considerable interest, from his account of the origins of the Bolognese schools to famous 
anecdotes, loosely based on the Diet of Roncaglia, regarding exchanges between Bolognese lawyers 
and emperors on the limits of imperial authority.15 Regarding the Peace of Constance, scholarship has 
rather considered how the existence of Odofredus’ glosses influenced its inclusion in collections of 
feudal law, or how one of the most famous late medieval lawyers, Baldus de Ubaldis, expanded those 
glosses for a new commentary at the end of the fourteenth century.16 The emphasis in those works is 
                                                 
13 For the biography of Odofredus: E. Spagnesi, ‘Odofredo Denari’, in Dizionario biografico dei 
giuristi italiani (Bologna, 2013), 1450–52. For the scholarship on the Peace of Constance see notes 1 
to 3. 
14 Dolezalek, ‘Der Friede’, 277–308;  N. Tamassia, ‘Odofredo. Studio storico-giuridico’, in Scritti di 
storia giuridica (3 vols., Padua, 1967), ii. 335–464. 
15 Pennington, The Prince, 8–37. 
16 M. Ascheri, ‘La “pace” di Costanza (1183), fondamento delle libertà cittadine nel regno d’Italia, e i 
suoi giuristi’, Initium. Revista catalana d’història del dret, 15 (2010), 215–36; J. Canning, The 
Political Tthought of Baldus de Ubaldis (Cambridge, 1987), 9, 94, 115, 118; Dolezalek, ‘Der Friede’, 
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overwhelmingly on Baldus, however, rather than Odofredus, which also led them to consider only 
Odofredus’ glosses, ignoring his lectures. That is probably one of the reasons why his account of the 
Peace of Constance has been ignored as an eccentric mistake, because the glosses alone do not add up, 
and, as we shall see, it is the lectures that provide the interpretative key to Odofredus’ testimony. More 
generally, Odofredus’ comments on the Peace of Constance have not been touched by the recent 
decline of the tendency to distinguish legal theory and practice and to consider medieval jurists in 
isolation from the social and political context in which they lived.17 
In order to evaluate Odofredus’ account it will first be necessary to reconstruct it in full for the 
first time by comparing his glosses with his lectures. The resulting evidence will then be judged 
against other historical sources and possible sources of inspiration. The second half of the article will 
contextualise the account in its historical background, highlighting links with the conflict that was 
fought between the League and Emperor Frederick II (Barbarossa’s grandson) from 1226 to 1250, 
which primary sources called Negotium Lombardie, as well as with the impact of that conflict on the 
Bolognese schools and their output. 
It will be argued that Odofredus’ testimony was actually far less outlandish than it might seem 
at first sight, to the extent that scholarship should modify its understanding of the Peace of Constance. 
Moreover, rather than a self-contained eccentric academic exercise, Odofredus’ account engaged with 
the Negotium Lombardie, to the extent that it can be considered a forgotten Lombard response to the 
ruling by Frederick II and the German princes against the Peace of Constance as well as to the far 
more renowned Liber Augustalis, in which Frederick famously asserted the centrality and self-
                                                 
277-308; M. Ryan, ‘Bartulus of Sassoferrato and free cities’, Transactions of the Royal Historical 
Society, 10 (2000), 67–89. 
17 On recent trends: S. Menzinger and M. Vallerani, ‘Giuristi e città: fiscalità, giustizia e cultura 
giuridica tra XII e XIII secolo. Ipotesi e percorsi di ricerca’, in M. T. Caciorgna, S. Carrocci, and A. 
Zorzi, eds., I comuni di Jean Maire Vigueur. Percorsi storiografici (Rome, 2013),  202–34. 
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sufficiency of imperial/royal rule.18 In that respect, the attention Odofredus paid to the Peace of 
Constance belonged to a wider set of reactions from the schools of Bologna to the Negotium 
Lombardie, during which they shared the fortunes of their city. Yet of perhaps more profound and 
wider consequence will be the argument that the Peace of Constance directly informed seminal 
debates on princely rule (the emperor was considered the paradigmatic ruler) and popular sovereignty, 
to which the more eccentric features of Odofredus’ account related. Indeed, that account and its legacy 
represent an overlooked but noteworthy window not only on to the political culture of Communal Italy 
regarding kingship and rulership as a whole, but also on the contribution from Communal Italy to 
wider and long-term European developments. For, albeit virtually forgotten now, Odofredus’ account 
of the Peace of Constance became the standard one among the late medieval and early modern 
scholars mentioned above. 
 
Odofredus’ account vis-à-vis conventional ones 
After the victory of the League at the Battle of Legnano of 1176, negotiations gained momentum at the 
end of a six-year truce stipulated at the Peace of Venice of 1177. A group of imperial representatives 
led by Bishop William of Asti reached a preliminary agreement with those of the League at Piacenza 
at the end of April 1183.19 On 1 May, and again at Piacenza, the members of the League pledged to 
keep firm the terms of the settlement and renewed their oath of association.20 It was then the turn of 
the League to send envoys to the emperor, who received them at Constance and issued the settlement 
as a charter.21 That is where the account of the Peace of Constance found in secondary literature, 
                                                 
18 For the significance of the Liber Augustalis: K. Pennington, ‘Law, legislative authority and theories 
of government, 1150–1300’, in J.H. Burns, ed., The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought, 
c.350–c.1450 (Cambridge, 1988), 441–2. 
19 Friderici I Diplomata. 1181–1190,.no. 844. 
20 E. Falconi, ‘La documentazione della Pace di Costanza’, in Studi sulla Pace di Costanza (Milan, 
1984), 71-2. 
21 Friderici I Diplomata. 1181-1190, no. 848. 
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which is based on what can be described as a canonically accepted body of documentary sources, 
conventionally end.22 Outside that body of documentary sources, the chronicles that covered the reign 
of Barbarossa generally mentioned the Peace of Constance, but only referring telegraphically to a 
‘pax’, ‘pactum’, or ‘privilegium’ reached at Constance, and thus ignoring, for example, the above-
mentioned preliminary negotiations of Piacenza and the renewals of the League.23 The same applies to 
the numerous imperial charters and to the texts of the renewals of the League that referred to the Peace 
of Constance during the following half century. Yet it is worth noticing that the renewals of the 
League preferred to describe the Peace of Constance as a ‘pactum’, while emperors, and especially 
Frederick II, tended to describe it as a ‘privilegium’, which suggests that the League preferred to 
highlight its bilateral features and the emperors its hierarchical ones.24 The main exception to this 
pattern was the historical work of the Placentine Codagnello (d. c.1230), who actually referred to the 
settlement between the League and Barbarossa by only mentioning the preliminary negotiations that 
took place in his town, while totally ignoring the events of Constance.25 On the other hand, Codagnello 
mentioned the renewal of the League that took place at Milan in 1208, but not those that had taken 
place in his hometown around the time of the settlement, in 1183 and 1185, which, as we shall see, 
played a crucial role in Odofredus’ account.26 Regarding juridical works before those of Odofredus, 
                                                 
22 For the latest edition of that conventional body of primary sources as a whole: Falconi, ‘La 
documentazione della Pace di Costanza’, 21–104. 
23 For a list of chronicles: O. Capitani, ‘La storiografia coeva sulla pace di Costanza’, in La pace di 
Costanza 1183. Un difficile equilibrio di poteri fra società italiana ed impero (Bologna, 1984), 99–
118; G. Fasoli, ‘Note sulla pace di Costanza nella tradizione cronachistica e documentaria’, in Studi 
sulla pace di Costanza, 105–16. 
24 G. Raccagni, ‘Il diritto pubblico, la Pace di Costanza e i libri iurium dei comuni’, in Gli inizi del 
diritto pubblico europeo, II, 309–39. 
25 Iohannis Codagnelli Annales Placentini, ed. O Holder-Egger (MGH, Scriptores in usum scholarum 
separatim editi, 23; Hanover and Leipzig, 1901), 12. 
26 Ibid., 34. 
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Azo of Bologna also left comments on the Peace of Constance, which will be considered towards the 
end of this article. 
Odofredus’ glosses on the Peace of Constance, which he produced between 1232 and 1250 
(they described Frederick II as being alive and Odofredus is first attested as legum professor in 1232), 
are in line with the evidence mentioned above, and, in the light of the different attitudes of the League 
and of the Empire, they run with the hare and hunt with the hounds when they describe the settlement 
as an agreement as well as an imperial law. He glossed Barbarossa’s statement that he had made the 
concessions to the cities ‘pro bono pacis’ by stating that ‘pax’ derived from ‘pactio’ and thus denoted 
an agreement.27 He then glossed the emperor’s declaration that he wished to bestow the regalia to the 
cities by noticing how the Peace of Constance was an imperial law because what pleases the prince 
has the force of law.28 Both arguments derived from Roman law.29 
The glosses, however, differ markedly from the narrative found in current secondary literature 
in the way they considered the Peace of Constance in conjunction with another document that appears 
to have nothing to do with it, that is, a renewal of the oath of association of the League. Indeed, the 
glosses embraced the two texts as if they were a single set. In the oath the members of the League 
swore to keep the terms of the peace, to help each other, and to follow the precepts of its rectors.30 
Odofredus commented upon that by stating that the emperor took the same oath himself by proxy, but 
                                                 
27 Mss. Venezia, Bibl. Nazionale Marciana, Marc. Lat., V 119 (2307) (hereafter Marc. Lat.), f. 30 r. 
For the manuscript tradition of Odofredus’ glosses: Dolezalek, ‘Der Friede’, 277–308. The manuscript 
used here is from a copy of the Libri Feurodum and it has been chosen because it comes from the 
thirteenth century and, contrary to others, the glosses feature alongside the text of the peace and that of 
the oath of 1185. The relation between those texts plays a fundamental role in the analysis here 
presented. 
28 Marc. Lat., f. 29 v. 
29 Digest, 1.4.1 and 2.14.1.1–2.  
30 Gli atti del Comune di Milano fino all’anno MCCXVI, ed. C. Manaresi (Milan, 1919): no. 147. 
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then wondered: ‘Sed quo modo possunt precepta iniungere principi, cum maior sit, et minor in 
maiorem non habeat imperium’.31 We will consider how this question was answered shortly. 
That joining of those two texts poses basic problems because the Peace of Constance displays 
the year 1183 while the renewal of the League attests that it took place at Piacenza on January 1185.32 
It is no wonder that their combination has been considered an eccentric mistake for centuries. In the 
sixteenth century, for example, Charles Dumoulin ridiculed Baldus as a senile old man because of his 
acceptance of Odofredus’ account.33  
Odofredus’ lectures, however, which he delivered at some point before his death in 1265, 
offer a solution for that quandary by expanding on how imperial prerogatives were identified at 
Constance. That is found in two passages, the longest one recounting that, when Barbarossa lost the 
conflict with the League, he asked it to send ambassadors to him, resulting in a great assembly at 
Constance where the ‘jurisdictio’ of the emperor was discussed. Negotiations, however, reached a 
standstill, which prompted the Lombards to express the wish to leave the assembly, to which 
Barbarossa replied stating that he wanted the whole world to know that they, and not him, were to 
blame for the failure of the negotiations. Whence, he declared that he was ready to submit himself to 
the jurisdiction of the rectors of the League, who would have been free to speak in his favour or 
against him. Thence the rectors decreed what the Lombard cities owed him, as it could be read in the 
Peace of Constance.34 Elsewhere in the lectures Odofredus elucidated the reason for the above-
mentioned standstill too. At Constance the parties agreed on everything apart from one issue: since the 
emperor was ‘superior’ they wondered whether the deal should be done ‘per modum pacis vel 
                                                 
31 Marc. Lat., f. 33v  
32 Gli atti del Comune di Milano fino all’anno MCCXVI, no. 147.  
33 Dolezalek, ‘Der Friede’, 277–308. 
34 Odofredo Denari, Lectura super Digesto Veteri (2 vols., Lugduni, 1550), ii. 41v: ‘Unde dico quod 
paratus sum me subicere iurisdictioni rectorum societatis Lombardie; et ipsi dicant quicquid volunt pro 
me et contra me ... Ita imperator tunc subiecit se iurisdictioni rectorum societatis lombardie et ipsi 
ordinaverunt ita, et sepe iam legi in illam pacem’. 
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sententie’. The emperor himself picked the second option and submitted to the ruling of the rectors of 
the League.35  
In other words, Odofredus’ lectures offer a rationale for the joining of the Peace of Constance 
with the oath of 1185: the content of the settlement was determined at Constance, but the solution that 
was agreed on what form the settlement should take, that is, Barbarossa’s submission to the ruling of 
the rectors of the League, could not find application there, because the rectors were not present at 
Constance, but only their envoys (‘nuntii’).36 That implied that an additional passage was needed, 
which would explain the inclusion of the Placentine oath of 1185.  
Glosses and lectures also share conceptual frameworks. When the glosses questioned how the 
precepts of the rectors of the League could bind the emperor the solution was found in a passage on 
the jurisdiction of judges from Justinian’s Codex. According to this, if, during a litigation between the 
emperor and a private individual, they agreed to submit to a judge, the emperor was supposed to 
accept his ruling no matter the status of that judge.37 Likewise, the above-mentioned accounts of the 
Peace of Constance from the lectures are examples used to discuss the jurisdiction of judges in Roman 
law, and especially how a iudex (the emperor being the highest) could submit to the jurisdiction of a 
‘minor vel equalis’. 
 That was an imaginative interpretation. Justinian’s Corpus Iuris Civilis certainly did not 
entertain the idea of a peace settlement between the emperor and his subjects following an armed 
conflict between them, and even less one in which at stake there was the prerogatives of the emperor 
himself. Odofredus squeezed the Peace of Constance into a scenario that was meant for much more 
                                                 
35 Odofredo Denari, Lectura super Infortiato, in novem posteriores libros (Lugduni, 1570), 88 v: ‘Et 
de omni eo concordaverunt nisi de uno. Vos estis superior, quomodo fiet istud, vel per modum pacis 
vel sententie, qui tulit eam dicit ipse volo me subicere societati rectorum lombardie … Potest ne 
Imperator se subicere? certe sic, quia consul potest subicere se iurisdictioni pretoris’. 
36 Friderici I Diplomata. 1181–1190, no. 848. 
37 Codex, 3.13.1.  
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mundane quarrels, not to mention the further interpretative squeeze that, in his account of the Peace of 
Constance, the judges who issued the ‘sententia’ were actually the representatives of the emperor’s 
subjects who had risen against him in the first place.  
Overall, Odofredus clearly overemphasised the role that the rectors of the League played 
during the peace process, and he added to it a further stage that took place at Piacenza in 1185, all of 
which he explained with, or used to illustrate passages from Roman law. However, it is clear that there 
was a rationale behind his interpretation, which, as discussed in the next section, was probably partly 
based on the fact that his account was actually not entirely off the mark.  
 
Reconnecting the Placentine events of 1185 to the Peace of Constance  
In the sixteenth century Charles Dumoulin’s criticism of Odofredus’ account flew in the face of the 
views of the majority, because the legal world generally accepted  Odofredus’ account and Baldus 
fully incorporated and acknowledged it in his own commentary, which came to feature in the printed 
editions of the Corpus Iuris Civilis.38 Until the first half of the twentieth century modern historical 
scholarship also occasionally considered the oath of 1185 as the last stage of the Peace of Constance.39 
Bizarrely, that was not based on the testimony of those legal sources but on the pledge of the oath of 
1185 to keep firm the peace, which alone does not prove much, given that it also featured in the 
renewals of the League of 1183, 1195, and 1208.40 In any case, scholarship has long fully forgotten or 
rejected in passing that interpretation. The volumes that were published on the 800th anniversary of 
the Peace of Constance, which still largely represent the state of the research on the topic, are very 
good examples of that.41 Indeed, one of them featured an edition of what was deemed the body of 
documentary sources on the Peace of Constance, which included the Placentine preliminary 
                                                 
38 Dolezalek, ‘Der Friede’, 277–308. 
39 O. Masnovo, ‘Ancora l’ultimo atto della Pace di Costanza’, Archivio storico lombardo, 52 (1925), 
22–37. 
40 Raccagni, The Lombard League, 147–88. 
41 They are the above-mentioned La pace di Costanza 1183 and Studi sulla pace di Costanza.  
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negotiations of 1183 and even the renewal of the League of that year, but ignored the Placentine 
events of 1185.42  
However, various factors suggest that a link between the Peace of Constance and what 
happened at Piacenza in 1185 might have really existed. An unrelated piece of evidence shows that 
Barbarossa was at Piacenza at the time of the renewal of the League during his first visit to Italy after 
the end of the conflict.43 That must have been a truly exceptional event, because he had never before 
been so geographically close to an assembly of the League. It would have been very surprising if they 
had not interacted on that occasion, because there is evidence of collaboration between them 
immediately after it.44 It is also worth considering that the events of 1185 took place in the same town 
where the preliminary settlement had been reached, and one should not forget that the renewal of the 
League of 1185 mirrored the one that had been performed at Piacenza in the aftermath of that 
preliminary agreement. Therefore the suggestion that the Peace of Constance might have been 
confirmed at Piacenza in 1185, in a gathering that, formally or informally, closed the peace process on 
Lombard soil, in the same place where it had started, and for the first time in the presence of both the 
emperor and the rectors of the League, becomes far less implausible.  
Including the events of Piacenza of 1185 in the peace process as suggested by Odofredus 
would significantly alter our understanding of it in ways that match and even bolster the 
contentiousness of the tale about Barbarossa’s submission to the ruling of the rectors of the League. 
The choice of meeting places has always played an essential part in the symbolical meaning behind 
peacemaking. Meetings between equals usually took place in border areas, and those between 
superiors and inferiors within the territory of the superior or winning side.45 As underlined by 
Odofredus himself, in the Peace of Constance one of the parties was superior to the other, and 
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Constance was on German soil, but it was the inferior party who got the upper hand and the settlement 
took both the shape of an agreement and a charter. Ending the peace process at Piacenza in 1185 
matches those features more closely than stopping with the pardon/charter granted at Constance, not to 
mention that Piacenza had been one of the favourite meeting places of the League and was the junior 
partner of Milan, which by then was the leader of the League.46 In 1186 the spotlight moved to Milan 
itself, where the wedding and a ceremonial coronation of Barbarossa’s son, Henry VI, took place in 
the presence of representatives of the League.47 
It is also worth considering the role of Piacenza in the light of the Diet of Roncaglia. The plain 
of Roncaglia was the favourite location for imperial diets in northern Italy, but it was a handful of 
kilometres from Piacenza and belonged to its contado.48 The League played a fundamental role in the 
conceptual subordination of the contadi to their respective civitates, a trend that Barbarossa had tried 
to reverse.49 Was the choice of Piacenza for the preliminary agreement and the ratification of the Peace 
of Constance a conscious symbolic mimicking of the Diet of Roncaglia as well as a symbolic 
reaffirmation of the urban dominance in northern Italy? That of 1158 was the last diet held at 
Roncaglia and the following ones were held in urban centres.  
Therefore the evidence here examined suggests that Odofredus’ account probably expanded 
upon genuine historical events, but there is also reason to believe that he accessed a distinctive 
memory of them that was available in his hometown. The Peace of Constance and the oath of 1185, in 
fact, are also found side by side in the Bolognese liber iurium, known as Registro Grosso, which was 
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produced in the early 1220s, around a decade before Odofredus’ works.50 The oath of 1185, in 
particular, had no reason to circulate outside city archives. The copy of the Peace of Constance that 
features alongside Odofredus’ glosses did not directly derive from those of the libri iurium, but no 
such analysis has been done on the oath of 1185.51 Before Odofredus, that oath was copied in the libri 
iurium of three cities, but in two different versions, one in that of Piacenza and the other in those of 
Bologna and Modena.52 Odofredus’ version clearly matches most of the variants by which the 
Bolognese text differs from the others.53 Odofredus might have searched the Bolognese archives, but 
the libri iurium were meant to be of public utility, to facilitate the conservation as well as the 
consultation of the documentation kept in the archives, and even to work as historical tools for future 
generations.54 The location of the two texts within the Registro Grosso might have been accidental, but 
the libri iurium were deliberate and official selections and arrangements of archival material.55 Thus 
the Registro Grosso did not include all the surviving records of the League involving Bologna, and the 
selection made by its compilers has been described as part of a drive towards the establishment of an 
official civic memory regarding the clashes with the empire in the build-up of the Negotium 
Lombardie.56 
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53 Ibid. 
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Given the likely connections between the oath of 1185 and the Peace of Constance, and the 
Bolognese background of both the Registro Grosso and Odofredus’s account, it is quite unlikely that 
their similarities, which have no parallel, were fortuitous. Indeed, while the Peace of Constance and 
the oath of 1185 involved the League, and the latter referred to the former, they were surrounded by 
material that had nothing to do with them. In other words, in the more than likely event that Odofredus 
accessed the Registro Grosso, he might have interpreted the Peace of Constance and the oath of 1185 
as a single set, to which he added his own glosses.  
Moreover, Odofredus and the compilers of the Registro Grosso came from a similar 
background that was closely connected to the Bolognese communal government. The latter officially 
entrusted the production of the Registro Grosso to a commission of notaries under the leadership of 
Ranieri da Perugia (1185–1245), a leading figure of the Bolognese notarial school, and Ranieri himself 
was responsible for the section featuring the Peace of Constance.57 The relationship between the 
Bolognese commune, the notarial and the law schools in that period has been described as a symbiotic 
one.58 A very good example that involved Odofredus himself comes from his inclusion as witness, 
together with Salatiele, a former student of his and a colleague of the recently deceased Ranieri, at the 
treaty of capitulation of Modena to Bologna, its neighbour and archenemy, in 1249.59 There are 
various other examples of Odofredus’ participation in local administrative life from the period in 
which he produced his comments on the Peace of Constance.60 
 
Odofredus’ account and the Negotium Lombardie 
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Secondary literature on Odofredus’ glosses has generally portrayed them as a mere self-contained 
eccentric academic exercise. True, they featured no direct reference to contemporary politics. 
However, Odofredus produced them during the Negotium Lombardie, in the course of which the Peace 
of Constance became the manifesto of the League and Frederick II’s bane. Besides, Bologna was a 
leading member of the League, which brought heavy repercussions upon its schools.  
  The Peace of Constance was in the spotlight from the very beginning of the conflict. The 
Lombard cities justified the renewal of the League of 1226 by appealing to the clause of the Peace of 
Constance that allowed them to do so.61 Frederick replied with an imperial ban, a sentence that 
automatically suspended all grants enjoyed by the recipients, but on that occasion he mentioned the 
Peace of Constance expressly.62 Yet the emperor soon started to argue that he was not bound by the 
Peace of Constance because, as the princes of the empire had officially acknowledged too, that 
settlement was prejudicial to the honour and rights of the empire. He even placed the acceptance of its 
revocation by the Lombards as a prerequisite for any negotiation. Traces of those arguments can be 
found at least since the early 1230s, around the time when Odofredus became legum professor.63 And 
Frederick continued to reject the Peace of Constance until his death. There is evidence suggesting that 
for a period the League came close to accepting its revocation after the defeat at Cortenuova of 1237.64  
The imperial ban of 1226 that mentioned the Peace of Constance also decreed the closure of 
their schools and threatened any who defied that measure with everlasting infamy.65 In the following 
years Frederick and his supporters actively discouraged students and teachers from attending schools 
that belonged to members of the League, luring them to new pro-imperial centres such as Naples and 
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Siena.66 Bologna was particularly targeted because of its leading role in the League and because it was 
one of the main academic centres in Christendom. Its communal government took countermeasures to 
support its schools, applying a carrot-and-stick policy towards teachers and students.67  
 Therefore, when Odofredus produced his account Frederick utterly rejected the Peace of 
Constance while the League took it as its manifesto. Not to mention that he lived in one of the cities 
that was a leading member of the League and taught in an academic institution that Frederick had 
outlawed. Odofredus’ residence in Bologna and his collaborations with its government give us good 
clues about his position. Further confirmation of his inclinations comes from his above-mentioned 
inclusion as witness in the surrender of Modena to Bologna in 1249, which took the shape of an 
agreement aimed to preserve the ‘bonum statum’ of the League.68 Modena had been a keen imperial 
supporter, and its surrender followed the Bolognese victory of Fossalta, where the Bolognese also 
captured Frederick’s son, Enzius, never to release him despite imperial threats.69  
In that context, despite their silence regarding contemporary politics, Odofredus’ comments 
implicitly acquired a very loud political significance. Indeed, his glosses practically amounted to a 
political pamphlet, although the inclusion of the same arguments in his lectures suggest that those 
arguments were not just born out of political expediency, but belonged to Odofredus’ mindset and 
cultural background. In those comments he did recognise how imperial bans called off imperial 
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grants.70 Yet those bans were quite a common hazard for the Italian cities that came and went, and by 
the time Odofredus wrote his works at stake rather was the intrinsic lawfulness of the Peace of 
Constance. The very production of his comments and their silence regarding Frederick’s rejection 
implied that Odofredus disregarded that rejection. Indeed, by contextualising the Peace of Constance 
in Roman law, he implicitly responded to imperial arguments too: if Roman law, as the Diet of 
Roncaglia had underlined, was one of the main sources of legitimacy for imperial authority, and the 
Peace of Constance fit into it, then how could it be prejudicial to the rights and honour of the empire? 
Moreover, the very tale of Frederick’s grandfather’s submission to the rectors of the League must have 
been particularly incendiary during the Negotium Lombardie. Finally, while the leading Bolognese 
jurists had endorsed the Diet of Roncaglia, the same did not apply to the Peace of Constance, in which 
no Bolognese jurist was directly involved. Thus one is left wondering whether, by producing his 
glosses, one of Odofredus’ aims was to fill that gap.  
In that respect, Odofredus’ positions were remarkably similar to those of the Commune of 
Bologna and of the League, to both of which, as we have seen, he was close, but they could also be 
coupled to other reactions of the Bolognese learned community to the challenge posed by Frederick II. 
Around 1230 in his Dictamina Rhetorica (one of the most popular medieval collections of model 
epistles) Guido Faba included a verisimilar letter that suggested papal recognition of the Peace of 
Constance.71 In 1226 Boncompagno da Signa, mentioned the Peace of Constance in a section 
describing the relations between the emperor and the Italian cities of his Rhetorica Antiqua, by which 
he probably argued for the preservation of the status quo.72 References to the Peace of Constance can 
be found in the works of other jurists, all of which also ignored Frederick’s rejection, including Azo 
(more on him later), and Accursius (in what became the Glossa Ordinaria to the Corpus Iuris Civilis) 
who in that occasion defied his strong tendency to avoid references to actual events in his works.73 
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Moreover, the function of Odofredus’ comments on the Peace of Constance was comparable to that of 
a forged privilege of Emperor Theodosius, whose production has also been linked to the Bolognese 
schools at that time.74 As that privilege was meant to support Bologna and its schools, Odofredus’ 
glosses endorsed the legal foundation of the League and of Bologna’s autonomy within the empire. 
Guido Faba also described his hometown as the recipient of a divine privilege corroborated by all the 
angels that made it an everlasting source of knowledge.75  
 
The Peace of Constance, kingship and popular sovereignty 
Unfortunately Frederick II never explained why he thought that the Peace of Constance was 
prejudicial to the honour and rights of the empire, but suggestions can be made here.76 To start with, as 
it was an example of a successful rebellion against imperial authority, the Peace of Constance 
inherently clashed with Frederick’s views on kingship as displayed in his famous Liber Augustalis of 
1231 (around the time of Odofredus’ graduation), with its emphasis on the lex regia (by which the 
Roman people would had granted universal jurisdiction to the emperor), the sacrality of kingship, and 
with its portrayal of actions of lese-majesty as tantamount to sacrilege.77 Although promulgated for the 
Regnum Sicilie, the Liber Augustalis stated general views on rulership and bore the ambiguity of a text 
that ‘expressed the will of a man who was also emperor of the Holy Roman Empire’, as Frederick 
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presented himself on that occasion.78 Indeed, in the 1230s Frederick openly parallelled the League’s 
resistance against him to heresy.79  
Indeed, Frederick probably did not feel bound to a settlement that severely limited his 
prerogatives and had been forced upon his grandfather by his own subjects. When he had restored 
control over his Sicilian Kingdom, for example, he had already revoked grants made by his 
predecessors there, claiming that they were prejudicial to the interests of the crown and had been made 
under the stress of circumstances.80 In 1232 Frederick’s representatives asked for the restitution of the 
iura regalia in Lombardy, but the League refused to change what had been decided at Constance.81  
More specifically, the clause of the Peace of Constance that enabled renewals of the League 
probably played a leading role.82 After all, following the example of his predecessors since 1183, 
Frederick had not shown any particular problem in recognising the Peace of Constance before the 
renewal of the League of 1226, although the above-mentioned different interpretations of it by League 
and emperors (one describing it as a pactum and the others as a privilegium) suggest the existence of 
underlying tensions even before 1226.83 Yet after the renewal of 1226, as Frederick rejected the Peace 
of Constance, he also categorically refused to name the League, which, at best, he called ‘societas 
illicita’.84  
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The vision of imperial rule offered by Odofredus’ account, on the other hand, sharply 
contrasted with the God-given and top-down form of lordship exposed by Frederick’s court. If the 
Peace of Constance was the lawful outcome of a famed successful rebellion, and such an occasion 
could be dealt with by following procedures taken from Roman law that applied to any state official, 
what was left of the sacrality of kingship and the equation of rebellion to sacrilege?  
Yet the tale of the emperor’s submission to the rectors of the League also probably engaged 
with the groundbreaking debate that was taking place over the lex regia and popular sovereignty, a 
debate that had a remarkable and enduring impact on European political thought.85 One of Odofredus’ 
predecessors, Azo (d. c.1230), in particular, had already started to challenge the view according to 
which the people had alienated all authority to the emperor with the lex regia. Azo had rather argued 
that the consent of the people taken as a whole (‘populus sive universitas’) was necessary for the 
institution of imperium and iurisdictio, and, what is more, that the people had not abdicated its power 
completely, but could revoke that transfer as it had already done in the past, although Azo omitted to 
specify when.86 The corollary was that the status of the emperor himself was that of an official.87  
Scholarship has acknowledged that the resistance of the Lombards to Barbarossa broadly 
helped to create an environment of weak imperial rule that generated the freedom to reconsider the lex 
regia, but it can be suggested here that the Peace of Constance informed that reconsideration 
directly.88 Azo, for example, left comments on the Peace of Constance that have been overlooked by 
modern scholars but matched his argument about popular sovereignty. First of all, the Lombards were 
perceived as a gens, the League a pan-Lombard universitas, and the Peace of Constance a pan-
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Lombard charter.89 In a quaestio tackling a series of legal powers exercised by city communes, Azo 
stated they were legally acceptable in ‘totam Lombardiam’ because of an imperial grant (clearly the 
Peace of Constance) that had replaced unwritten customs.90 Then, while discussing royal donations in 
his lectures on Justinian’s Codex, Azo endorsed the seemingly questionable legality of the Peace of 
Constance by arguing that the emperor and the Lombards had reached it consensually and for the sake 
of peace.91 Azo, whose closeness to the Commune of Bologna was comparable to that of Odofredus, 
mostly lived before the Negotium Lombardie, but he also witnessed its very beginning.92 Indeed, the 
Peace of Constance is the main candidate for the unnamed historical example Azo had in mind when 
he stated that the populus had revoked the lex regia in the past, by which he probably also meant that 
it was renegotiated, because Azo did not deny the emperor still held authority in Italy. The Diet of 
Roncaglia had essentially reenacted the lex regia by stating that ‘Omnis iurisdictio et omnis districtus 
apud principem est’.93 Yet during its rebellion the League not only annulled any progress that 
Barbarossa had made in implementing the programme of Roncaglia, but it also usurped imperial 
prerogatives.94 Therefore the Peace of Constance constituted a very recent historical example of how 
subjects could challenge, revoke and renegotiate imperial prerogatives. 
As mentioned above, Odofredus’s comments paid lip service to the lex regia, but in reality his 
tale of voluntary submission of the emperor, for the definitions of his own jurisdictio, to the ruling of 
the rectors of the League was a mockery of it. That tale rather followed the outline of Azo’s ideas on 
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popular sovereignty, but anchored them much more emphatically to a famous and recent historical 
example. After all, the rectors were representatives of a universitas of the emperor’s subjects, and 
Odofredus’ justification for the emperor’s submission, which he based on the above-mentioned 
passage of Justinian’s Codex on the jurisdiction of judges, went in the same direction as Azo because, 
as Odofredus’ lectures specified, the same principle applied to any magistrate.95 Just like Azo, 
Odofredus argued that the Peace of Constance was achieved ‘pro bono pacis’ and consensually 
between the emperor and his subjects.  
The principles that Odofredus underlined in his comments were certainly far closer to those 
that underpinned political life in the city republics than to those of Frederick’s court. The beginning of 
Odofredus’ glosses amounts to a short speculum principis, where, commenting upon Barbarossa’s 
wording, he praised virtues such as mildness, law abidance, and love of justice, the defence of which 
some Bolognese legal circles identified as the foundation of the lawfulness of the League.96 Indeed, 
given its chronological and thematic coordinates, Odofredus’ comments on the Peace of Constance 
could be considered a Lombard answer to Frederick’s Liber Augustalis. 
 
Conclusions 
There is more than a kernel of forgotten but noteworthy truth in the apparent eccentricity of 
Odofredus’ account, which makes it one of the most valuable sources on the Peace of Constance. 
While scholarship ends the peace process with the issue of the charter at Constance in 1183, 
Odofredus’ inclusion of a further stage that took place at Piacenza in 1185 is corroborated by indirect 
evidence. While Barbarossa certainly did not take the oath of the League together with its members in 
1185, in all probability the Placentine events of 1185 did ratify the Peace of Constance on Lombard 
soil as Odofredus stated. Odofredus then built the more unconventional aspects of his account on local 
memories that he probably sourced from the Bolognese Registro Grosso. Adding that additional stage 
to the peace process would better match the complex features of the Peace of Constance, but would 
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also change our understanding of it, further emphasising the strength of the position of the League to 
the detriment of that of the emperor in a way that goes in the direction of the underlying themes of 
Odofredus’ account.  
Yet above all, Odofredus’ account calls attention to how the great significance of the Peace of 
Constance rest not merely on its formalisation of the cities’ autonomy but also, and in some contexts 
even more, on what it had to say about kingship and rulership in general. For scholarship does not 
seem to have fully appreciated the status that the Peace of Constance immediately reached as a prime 
example of a settlement between ruler and subjects, a status which was immediately well known 
across the empire, and which did not fade but rather expanded in time and space. The Peace of 
Constance mutually formalised the position of both warring parties, including the recognition of 
prerogatives embodying the enduring superiority of the emperor. In that respect it can be described as 
a mirror twin of the previous Diet of Roncaglia, for although it confirmed the conceptual framework 
set up at Roncaglia, it revised it and renegotiated its applications following a successful challenge to 
imperial authority that had reconfigured the balance of power between emperor and Lombard cities.  
Indeed, the long legacy of the Peace of Constance constitutes a remarkable case of 
intermingling between the practice and conceptualisation of rulership. As we have seen, the references 
by Odofredus and his colleagues to the Peace of Constance challenged tendencies to avoid citing 
actual events in legal works. At the same time, perceptions of the Peace of Constance had a profound 
practical impact outside academia too, and that was especially the case during the Negotium 
Lombardie, which was fought in the second quarter of the thirteenth century. In turn, while the Peace 
of Constance was known and discussed at Bologna and more widely in Lombardy and the empire 
between 1183 and 1226, the Negotium Lombardie was in all probability one of the main reasons why 
the Peace of Constance attracted such an academic interest in the first place in thirteenth-century 
Bologna. Contrary to the previous conflict between Barbarossa and the League, no settlement was 
achieved during the Negotium Lombardie, which was still raging when Frederick II died in 1250. One 
of the reasons for that was probably Frederick’s stubborn rejection, backed by the princes of the 
empire, of the very nature of the Peace of Constance, while the League took it as its manifesto. Thus 
the Peace of Constance itself contributed to undermining peacemaking during the Negotium 
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Lombardie, which is quite ironic given how both Barbarossa and Lombard lawyers highlighted that it 
was reached pro bono pacis. 
Despite its grounding in pre-existing memories of the Peace of Constance and its silence 
regarding contemporary politics, Odofredus’ account had an intrinsic political significance during the 
Negotium Lombardie and was meant to engage with it. It inherently supported the lawfulness of the 
Peace of Constance, which reflected the position of the League, but the most peculiar feature of the 
account, that is, the tale of Barbarossa’s submission to the ruling of the rectors of the League, was 
even more caustic than the League’s more passive resistance during the Negotium Lombardie. 
Odofredus was very close to the League through his Bolognese background. As his likely source of 
inspiration, the Registro Grosso was the product of the cooperation between the Bolognese political 
and intellectual elites, so the Bolognese commune and schools found themselves on the same side 
during the Negotium Lombardie. Odofredus’ account can be contextualised in the reactions of the 
Bolognese schools and commune to the threat posed by Frederick II and his top-down views. In all 
probability Odofredus’ glosses served to respond to Frederick’s issue of the Liber Augustalis and to 
the refutation of the Peace of Constance by him and the German princes.   
At the same time, Odofredus’s account touched upon general themes that went well beyond 
the mere confines of the Negotium Lombardie in the imaginative and multifaceted way it tackled the 
very heart of rulership. Indeed, his inclusion of the same comments in his academic lectures suggests   
that they were deeply entrenched in his cultural mindset. Those comments implicitly validated the 
outcome of a rebellion against the emperor, which itself challenged sacral concepts of kingship such as 
those exemplified by the Liber Augustalis. He then killed several birds with one stone when he used 
the Peace of Constance as an example of the principle by which a higher judge could submit to the 
jurisdiction of a ‘minor vel equalis’: he suggested a legal framework, based on Roman law, for the 
resolution of disputes between the emperor and his subjects; placed the emperor on a par with any 
state official; yet with the minor being a college of representatives of the emperor’s subjects, and the 
purpose of its ruling being to define imperial prerogatives, Odofredus’ account was practically a 
mockery of the lex regia. Such a position built on the outline of Azo’s previous groundbreaking 
discussion on popular sovereignty, but Odofredus placed Azo’s principles on a far more solid factual 
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ground. In fact, a comparison between their works has revealed that Azo himself made passing 
comments on the Peace of Constance that matched his doctrine on popular sovereignty, suggesting 
that the Peace of Constance may well have contributed to inspiring that doctrine in the first place.  
Furthermore, Odofredus’ account also broke through the confines of the Negotium Lombardie 
in time and space, becoming virtually the standard legal narrative in the surprisingly influential long-
term legacy of the Peace of Constance. The reception of Odofredus’ account needs to be explored 
further, but he, and the League, clearly won the contest over the Peace of Constance against Frederick 
II. The emperor’s rejection was largely ignored and in later centuries utterly forgotten. The Peace of 
Constance, on the other hand, continued to be considered a working document, to be used and 
discussed in politics and in the legal world, where, in the shape that Odofredus had given to it, it 
became a classic text. The Peace of Constance and the oath of 1185, accompanied by Odofredus’ 
glosses, were occasionally included in the Libri Feudorum, while Odofredus’ lectures enjoyed an 
extraordinary success for centuries.97 Odofredus’ glosses then reached Baldus in the fourteenth 
century, who fully accepted and acknowledged Odofredus’ account in his expanded commentary on 
the Peace of Constance. Baldus’ commentary, in turn, was included alongside the Peace of Constance 
in the printed editions of the Corpus Iuris Civilis, which was the source of the many subsequent 
references to the Peace of Constance from across Europe. In the early seventeenth century, for 
example, Pierre Goudelin acknowledged that he had found the Peace of Constance and the Placentine 
oath of 1185 in the Corpus Iuris Civilis and that he was aware of Baldus’ commentary.98  
Thus the Corpus Iuris Civilis, which itself was the product of a period of Roman history 
known as the Dominate, and a treasure trove for theorists across the Middle Ages and the early 
modern period, came to include a prime historical example of a successful rebellion against the 
emperor. Yet it also featured the Peace of Constance accompanied by a narrative which was even 
more unfavourable for the emperor than the text of the settlement alone, embodying strong notions of 
                                                 
97 Spagnesi, ‘Denari’. 
98 Lesaffer, ‘An early treatise’, 228. 
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popular sovereignty in the way it claimed that the emperor had submitted to rebelling subjects for the 
definitions of his own prerogatives.  
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